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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 12-3648 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MIGUEL VAZQUEZ, 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5-12-cr-00007-001) 
District Judge: James Knoll Gardner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, SHWARTZ, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 24, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Miguel Vazquez appeals the sentence imposed upon him, arguing that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing.  For the reasons herein, 
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we will not review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal and will 
affirm the judgment of sentence. 
I. 
 As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  On May 23, 2011, Vazquez entered a plea agreement as to a 
54-count information in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Counts 1-52 charged 
Vazquez with aiding the preparation and filing of false income tax returns for other 
people, and Counts 53 and 54 charged Vazquez with filing false income tax returns for 
himself.  Under the plea agreement, Vazquez agreed to waive all rights to appeal or 
collaterally attack his conviction or sentence.   
The District Court held a sentencing hearing on June 11, 2012.  At the outset of 
the hearing, the District Court directed that Vazquez be sworn.  After hearing testimony 
from a number of character witnesses, the District Court asked defense counsel whether 
his client wished to testify and counsel responded affirmatively.  Rather than proceeding 
with a traditional sentencing allocution, the District Court directed that Vazquez take the 
witness stand, recognized that Vazquez was under oath, and directed counsel to inquire of 
his client.  Counsel asked Vazquez questions concerning the circumstances of his guilty 
plea, his receipt of public assistance, and his payment of restitution.  Vazquez responded 
with fact testimony, but also made statements expressing remorse and his desire to be a 
better person in the future.  Counsel then asked Vazquez whether there was anything else 
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he wanted to say to the District Court before sentencing.  The District Court invited 
Vazquez to speak in Spanish.  He stated: 
I want to say I am very sorry for what I have done.  I ask the forgiveness of 
the United States of America.  I thank the federal agents for presenting the 
case now instead of later.  Perhaps if it had gone on when it’s later, it would 
have been worse for me.  I thank the Lord that I have come to know Him 
and I’ve become spiritual.  And I only wish to ask the judge to grant me the 
opportunity to re-vindicate my life, be a good husband, help my children 
and become a better human being. 
 
App. 55-56. 
 The District Court then offered the Government an opportunity to cross-examine 
Vazquez.  The Government inquired as to the circumstances of the charged offenses, 
Vazquez’s receipt of public assistance payments, and Vazquez’s charitable contributions.  
During a brief re-direct examination, Vazquez testified that he had listed two properties 
for sale to put towards restitution.  Counsel was then asked to verify that the segment of 
Vasquez’s testimony in which he addressed the District Court was “his exercise of his 
right of allocution.”  App. 65.  Counsel verified that it was.  The District Court then asked 
counsel if Vazquez had anything else to say in allocution, and counsel replied that 
Vazquez did not.   
After each side presented its sentencing argument, the District Court asked 
whether there was “anything further from anyone” and each side responded in the 
negative.  App. 73.  The District Court then announced its sentence of 120 months’ 
imprisonment, one year of supervised release, restitution of $1,600,000 to the Internal 
Revenue Service, and $5,400 in special assessments.   
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Vazquez appealed his sentence.
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
 We ordinarily do not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct 
appeal.  United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).  Rather, the 
preferred avenue to raise ineffective assistance claims is a collateral proceeding pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because the district court is “the forum best suited to developing the 
facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation” before the trial court and 
has an “advantageous perspective” to evaluate the overall effectiveness of trial counsel.  
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-06 (2003).  Although there is a narrow 
exception to this rule in cases “[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel,” United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1991), this Court routinely declines to review ineffective assistance claims on direct 
                                                 
1
 The parties disagree about whether the waiver provision in Vazquez’s plea 
agreement precludes the present challenge to his sentence.  Because we decline to review 
the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal, we need not, and do not presently, 
decide whether Vazquez waived his right to raise such a claim.  Rather, we address only 
the procedural device to be used if the claim has not been waived and is not otherwise 
barred.  Thus, nothing herein constitutes a ruling as to whether Vazquez has waived his 
right to raise such a claim pursuant to his plea agreement or whether such a claim 
predicated upon Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 is cognizable under Section 2255.  See Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1962); United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
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appeal where either prong of the Strickland
2
 analysis would be better analyzed in the first 
instance before the trial court.  See, e.g., United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (declining to consider a direct appeal where “the record is insufficient for us to 
determine whether a reasonable attorney would have filed a motion to dismiss on speedy 
trial grounds”); Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272 (“Even though the Government concedes 
defense counsel’s error, the Court’s opinion in Massaro points out that the issue of 
prejudice is also best decided in the first instance in a collateral action rather than on 
direct review.”) (footnote omitted).  For the reasons that follow, both Strickland prongs 
are best assessed in this case before the District Court in the first instance. 
A. Adequacy of Representation 
 An assessment of defense counsel’s adequacy during the sentencing hearing may 
require a more developed record and, in any event, would be best performed in the first 
instance by the Judge present at the hearing.  Vazquez’s ineffective assistance claim 
concerns counsel’s failure to object when the District Court: (1) placed Vazquez under 
oath at the outset of the hearing and later permitted the United States to cross-examine 
him; and (2) did not ask Vazquez directly whether he wished to say anything further in 
allocution, purportedly in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  
                                                 
2
 Under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s 
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; 
and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the deficiency.  466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).   
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Both of these arguments concerning counsel’s performance would be better considered 
via a collateral attack (if such an attack has not been waived). 
 First, it is conceivable that counsel strategically chose to permit Vazquez to testify 
under oath during sentencing.  The present record reflects that, after Vazquez’s guilty 
plea, the District Court learned of potentially aggravating considerations involving 
dishonesty with the United States Probation Office, improper receipt of welfare 
payments, and failure to support numerous children.  Counsel may have decided that 
Vazquez could more credibly address these considerations while sworn and subject to 
cross-examination.  On the present record, we therefore “have no way of knowing 
whether” proceeding in this fashion without objection “had a sound strategic motive.”  
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. 
 Second, although the District Court may not have expressly asked Vazquez if he 
wished to allocute, the District Court did address Vazquez numerous times during the 
sentencing hearing, including a personal invitation to speak in his native language when 
Vazquez was about to express regret, seek forgiveness, thank the federal agents involved 
in his case, and ask the District Court for a second chance.  Under these circumstances, 
counsel may have determined that the interaction between Vazquez and the District Court 
fulfilled the requirements of Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) and that requesting anything more 
would have been unnecessary or strategically unsound.  Moreover, the District Court is in 
the best position to assess its unspoken interactions with Vazquez that may further 
solidify compliance with Rule 32 and show that counsel’s decision not to object to the 
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procedure the District Court employed during sentencing was sound.  See Green v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304-05 (1961) (“[T]his record, unlike a play, is 
unaccompanied with stage directions which may tell the significant cast of the eye or the 
nod of the head.  It may well be that the defendant himself was recognized and 
sufficiently apprised of his right to speak and chose to exercise this right through his 
counsel.”).  Because the present record appears to reflect that the District Court 
personally interacted with Vazquez, who in turn provided statements in allocution, this is 
not a case “in which trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record”3 that 
we will consider Vazquez’s ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal.  Massaro, 538 U.S. at 
508. 
B. Prejudice 
 Furthermore, assessing whether any deficiency in counsel’s performance at 
sentencing prejudiced Vazquez is a task uniquely suited, at least in the first instance, to 
the court that imposed his sentence.  See Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272 (stating that “the 
issue of prejudice is also best decided in the first instance in a collateral action rather than 
on direct review”) (citing Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505).  The present record reflects that the 
District Court considered Vazquez’s statements in light of the sentencing factors set forth 
                                                 
3
 Vazquez relies on our holding in United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 
2009), to argue that this case fits the narrow exception for situations where the record on 
direct appeal is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance.  In Polk, 
defense counsel “freely concede[d] that at sentencing he missed the arguable effect of” 
Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 520.  There has been no such concession here.  
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in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when it imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, which 
was within the advisory guideline range.  Thus, it may be difficult to show counsel’s 
performance prejudiced Vazquez in any way, but we will defer to the District Court to 
opine on this subject if Vazquez files, and it is determined he has not waived his right to 
pursue, a Section 2255 petition.
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence without prejudice to Vazquez’s filing of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 
raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, to the extent he is found not to have 
waived his right to do so.
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4
 Although Vazquez cites Adams, 252 F.3d 276, for the proposition that 
deficiencies in the allocution process are presumptively prejudicial, we have only applied 
the presumption in cases in which the defendant did not address the sentencing court at 
all.  Moreover, even if a presumption of prejudice attached, the District Court would be 
best-equipped to determine whether that presumption could be rebutted in the present 
case. 
 
5
 The motion of the United States for summary affirmance and to enforce the 
appellate waiver will be denied as moot. 
